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Minority Issues in 
Europe
SUMMARY: The nation-state has been redefined, and yet 
issues that affect it in its current form have been 
left unchanged. Issues of refugees and migrations 
have not been legislated since 1951 at the global 
level and turn of the millennium at the EU level. 
National minorities are perceived as a threat in 
“new” Europe while international organisations 
that should help central and eastern European 
states are being controlled by the West and are 
acting in the primary interest of western coun-
tries. Duality is thus being reinforced and accen-
tuated. The EU, Council of Europe and the OSCE 
are seemingly ignoring the process of significant 
racial, religious, cultural and civilizational chan-
ge across Europe. Weaker states are therefore 
unprepared and unsupported to deal with their 
minority issues and especially with the issues of 
new migrations to Europe. National sovereignty 
is connected with the securitisation of minority 
issues, in particular in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope. The process benefits ethno-nationalist po-
pulists that form governments that often create 
political pressure and economic instability, thus 
pushing their citizens to emigrate to “old” Eu-
rope. The process of reacting and antagonising 
immigrants is being repeated, and the whole of 
Europe is facing a problem functioning liberal 
democracies could solve with reformed modus 
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Introduction
In recent years, national minority groups living in ‘new’ European countries have experienced increased securitisation. For example, Slovakia has amended its citizenship law in 2011 and effectively 
banned dual citizenship in response to Hungary’s previously adopted 
policy of allowing ethnic Hungarians living abroad to apply for Hungar-
ian citizenship. Slovakian Prime Minister “has called Hungary’s move a 
‘security threat.’”1 Similarly, doubts about Hungarian loyalty has been 
expressed in Serbia and Romania, when the new Law on Hungarian 
Citizenship came into force on January 1, 2011.2
Originally, the liberal democratic model formed the foundation 
for sovereign nation-states sharing moral and ideological values, focus-
sing on the rights and inclusion of national minorities, in an integrated 
Europe. Since then, historical, political and security developments have 
destabilised the European Union as the integrative framework, whilst 
legal, political and security differences have the potential to divide the 
continent. The unofficial division that roughly coincides with Churchill’s 
‘Iron Curtain’ is reflected in different legal frameworks for minority pro-
tection in states of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe. Consequently, minority 
rights regime in the West is justice based and, in the East, it is security 
based (Kymlicka, 2004: 144-145). Whilst the security approach to mi-
norities in the ‘new’ Europe carries the risk of undermining the justice-
oriented approach supported in the ‘old’ Europe, national minorities are 
likely to encounter real or perceived discrimination, losing any hope 
that the justice approach will ever become a reality. As a consequence, 
the integration of society becomes more problematic, causing the state 
to reinforce its security concerns, leading to a vicious cycle. 
This paper aims to investigate minority protection in the context of 
security, law and politics. The international regime of national minori-
ties in Europe has been established since the 1990s with the adoption of 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
and the European Charter for Minority or Regional Languages at the 
Council of Europe. The ratification of these documents has been a re-
quirement for the newly emerging democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe but not so for the western countries of the ‘old’ Europe. Thus, 
it led to a duality in approaches to national minority protection. While 
1 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10166610 (13.12.2019.)
2 https://balkaninsight.com/2011/01/11/serbia-s-ethnic-hungarians-jump-at-citi-
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many de facto national minorities have not been recognised in the coun-
tries of the ‘old’ Europe those who have been recognised are enjoying 
protection based on a justice approach. The ‘new’ Europe states have 
offered formally a more inclusive approach by naming larger number 
of national minorities, but the principle of protection is security based.  
The lack of a universally accepted definition of a national minor-
ity provides states with a selective approach to their policies and ulti-
mately creates possibilities for instability within the society. The paper 
will focus on the security approach to minorities in the ‘new’ Europe. 
The international instruments for the protection of national minorities 
will be inspected in the context of the lack of universally agreed defini-
tion and the state’s freedom to apply or not to apply the instruments to 
a particular group by defining it or not as a national minority. State at-
titudes towards minorities are going to be tested as a means of checking 
whether the securitisation of the minority issues, developed in the ‘new’ 
Europe eventually affects the ‘old’ Europe. Diverse theoretical debate on 
these issues, referenced in the paper, will support the overall argument 
that diversity of approaches to national minority protection in Europe 
are undermining universal standards and commitments to liberal de-
mocracy, rule of law and human rights. 
This study is based on four years of fieldwork, carried out during 
my time in the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention of 
the Council of Europe. The two main research methods involved docu-
mentary analysis and non-participant observation. Documentary analy-
sis consisted of reviewing primary documents of the Council of Europe, 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe European Union 
and the United Nations. Participant observation occurred as part of my 
role in the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities, and its working groups providing ex-
pertise to the Council of Europe. In this position, I visited many Euro-
pean countries, visiting minority settlements in ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe, 
interviewing members of minority groups, activists, academic experts, 
civil servants and politicians at all levels of governments. This is provid-
ing for the assessment and comparative analysis of specific cases at the 
national level, national practices and efforts to develop pan-European 
standards of minority protection and integration. 
As part of participant observation, I reviewed reports by inter-
national organisations on member-state policies. It is expanded by an 
analysis of international instruments of minority protection and com-
parative study of individual states’ national minority legislation and pol-
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of international treaties that would help contextualise and offer insight 
into a dominant approach to the issue of national minority protection. 
Furthermore, specific national concepts, state legislations and policies 
towards minorities are subjected to critical comparative analysis. 
The framework provided has established the grounds for the argu-
ment and explanation of securitization of minority issues in the signifi-
cant number of countries and, arguably, in Europe as a whole. It is also 
reframing Europe into the two, as argued in the paper: the ‘old’ Europe 
in its superior behaviour and juxtaposition of national minority rights 
with regards to ‘new’ Europe, largely made of post-communist coun-
tries. A check of the policy of filling the leading positions in European 
institutions will add an element for discussion on the divided continent 
dominated by its one part. 
Literature Review
Academic literature on this topic, like the international organisa-
tions, is dominated by the approach stemming from the times of Hans 
Kohn and the idea of a “moralistic distinction between a ‘good’ nation-
alism, which he associated with the West, and a ‘bad’ nationalism typical 
for the non-Western world” (Jaskulowski, 2010: 290).  This idea gener-
ally shaped the academic debate on nationalism in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Kohn argued that western “nationalism found its ex-
pression predominantly, but never exclusively, in political and economic 
changes,” while elsewhere, it “found its expression predominantly in the 
cultural field” (Kohn, 2008: 4). “Even the classical theorists of nation-
alism,” Malešević argues, “such as Gellner and Anderson believed that 
nationalism is conceptually inchoate” (Malešević, 2019: 1). Anderson 
acknowledged a “‘political’ power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical 
poverty” (Anderson, 2006: 5).
Rezai describes the division “into western and eastern-central Eu-
rope,” and argue, by referencing Pentassuglia’s work (Pentassuglia, 2001: 
3-38) that “the main reason for this division lies in cultural and politi-
cal differences before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation 
of ‘the post-communist east’ and extension of western integration and 
complex minority standards” (Rezai, 2015: 60). “In Europe,” Pentas-
suglia argues, “the notion of the autonomy of minorities as a tool for 
preserving their identities strikes at the heart of further complexities” 
(Pentassuglia, 2001: 5).
Malešević, when analysing Western Balkans, notes that “both na-
tionalism and violence are regularly singled out as the most important 
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that “a careful historical sociological analysis shows that neither of the 
two common perceptions holds up”(Malešević, 2019: 185). Pieterse of-
fers a hypothesis that “nationalism refers to urban nationalism, while 
rural nationalism is often termed ethnicity” (Pieterse, 2004: 31). De-
layed urbanisation and industrialisation of large parts of Eastern and 
Central Europe might have provided some elements for the develop-
ment of distinctions on western, good, civic nationalism and eastern, 
bad, ethnic nationalism, as Schöpflin has interpreted Kohn’s categorisa-
tion (Schöpflin, 2000: 4-5). A large number of national minorities in the 
“new” Europe has been reflected in the state’s official recognition. It has 
possibly strengthened the form of ethnic nationalism, at least some of its 
manifestations, which, in turn, might have added to arguments on two 
different natures of nationalism – western and non-western.
Janmaat, in his testing of the Kohn’s hypothesis, suggests that in 
the West “the post-war political and economic achievements are likely 
to have increased … identification with public and political institu-
tions among broad sections of the population” (Janmaat, 2006: 72). The 
change, according to the same author, “might happen in East European 
countries,” following successful political and economic changes and 
“differences between East and West in the qualitative nature of national 
identifications might disappear altogether” (Janmaat, 2006: 72).
Other authors also observed the divide in Europe. Kymlicka ar-
gues that “in the West, there is a trend toward accepting the legitimacy 
of minority nationalism, and toward accommodating it through some 
form of territorial autonomy,” while in Central and Eastern Europe, 
“minority nationalism is often viewed as illegitimate, and the idea of 
territorial autonomy is strongly resisted.” (Kymlicka, 2004: 144-145). 
Other authors write about the “two processes: ... integration of Western 
European states and a process of disintegration in Central and Eastern 
Europe…” (Raduški, 2008: 235). Craig, however, draws a different con-
clusion. She demonstrates “how both political and legal considerations 
tend to inform the work of both the HCNm [High Commissioner for 
National Minorities] and the Advisory Committee [for the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities], supporting the 
claim that talk of two separate ‘minority rights’ tracks is no longer ap-
propriate” (Craig, 2012: 64). 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe going through the 
nation-building process in the renewed attempt of sovereign state devel-
opment did not offer their national minorities participation in the pro-
cesses of nationalising state. The accession to the EU process thus had to 




GOD. 3, BR. 3
in Europe was cemented as part of EU conditionality with the Copen-
hagen criteria of 1993” (Galbreath & McEvoy, 2010: 359). Thus, from 
the very beginning of the accession process, the ‘new’ Europe was in a 
discriminated position having to react to its irrational concerns about 
the minorities’ behaviours and loyalties and having to follow the dictate 
from the ‘old’ Europe. Galbreath & McEvoy found that “unsurprisingly, 
much of the literature on minority rights in Europe focuses on whether 
and how the EU’s ‘minority condition’ has been implemented in acces-
sion states” (Galbreath & McEvoy, 2010: 359).
The double standards of the European Union in the field of na-
tional minorities, as some authors (Johnson, 2006: 35) argue, have al-
ways been denied by officials in international organizations. Leaders of 
pan-European organisations, however, disagree with the division and 
repeat a mantra of one and unified Europe. Nils Muižnieks, then the 
Council of Europe’s Commissioner on Human Rights, disagreed there 
were two Europes, old and new, with different understandings of values, 
if not the norms.3
Academics do see the difference. “Minority rights is one of the ac-
cession criteria” (Kimlycka, 2002: 1). The European Union basing its 
policies on “standard-setting already initiated by the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, initially 
without any contribution of its own,” Nancheva explains, endorsed “the 
emerging European minority rights norms and project them externally 
as a condition for membership” (Nancheva, 2016: 140). Jutila found that 
“government representatives built new institutional structures to deal 
with minority situations in various Central and East European coun-
tries (Jutila, 2006: 167). These countries have been obliged to commit to 
such policies in the context the accession to the European Union. Thus 
with, “the complex role of nationalism in the region,” states Nancheva, 
“national minority regulation acquired even higher priority” (Nanche-
va, 2016: 132). She proceeds to argue, referencing Williams (2000) and 
Hillion (2004), that this minority rights regime “has been blamed for 
enforcing a double standard across ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe and especially 
in the process of EU membership preparation” (Nancheva, 2016: 133).
International Organizations and National Minority Regimes
A substantial problem in minority rights is a lack of a universally 
agreed definition. “Some attempted definitions of the term ‘national mi-
3 Nils Muižnieks during the meeting with members of the Advisory Committee on 
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nority’ have been quite broad,” Craig (2012: 47) summarises offering 
the example from the Council of Europe practice that suggested “cover-
ing groups of citizens who ‘maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties’ 
with the State and who ‘display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or 
linguistic characteristics’.”4  
Many international organizations offer their interpretations and 
understandings of national minorities. There is, however, a lack of a 
universally accepted definition of national minorities. The Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities “is the first legally 
binding multilateral instrument devoted to the protection of minorities 
and is regarded as the most comprehensive international standard in the 
field of minority rights.”5 Nevertheless, there is no definition of national 
minorities in the Convention. States that have ratified the Convention 
are given the space to self-define the minority. Thus, many states gen-
erally exclude non-citizens and migrants from protection under the 
Convention. Other states specify groups to whom the Framework Con-
vention is applicable. Besides, some states are claiming that no national 
minorities are living in their territories. The result is that only 39 out of 
47 Council of Europe members participate in the monitoring process. 
Even within states that have ratified the Convention, many groups are 
restricted from enjoying the protection.
While the Treaty of the European Union and the European Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights reference minority rights, Rezai points out 
that “the EU has no generally accepted legal definition for … national 
minority and … in regard to minority protection the EU relies on the 
COE’s protection system” (Rezai, 2015: 59). The Council of Europe and 
its bodies, however, do not define national minorities either.
An internationally accepted definition of national minorities ad-
opted by the United Nations in 1992 covers not only national but also 
religious, ethnic and linguistic minorities.6 This Declaration adds to the 
1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which states that persons 
belonging to minority groups will have the right “to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
4 Art. 1 of PACE Recommendation 1201 (1993) on an additional protocol on the rights 
of national minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights, 1 February 
1993. As quoted in Craig, Elizabeth. 2012. From security to justice? The development 
of a more justice-oriented approach to the realisation of European minority rights 
standards. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 30 (1). p.47.
5 https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guideminorities8en.pdf 
(21.04.2019.)
6 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
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language.”7 Some scholars, however, disagree and argue that “national 
minority is distinct from an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority” 
(Valentine, 2004: 445). The 1992 Declaration is focussed more on the 
rights and duties of states and minorities and less on the definition of 
minorities, thus leaving political space to states to interpret the Declara-
tion in practice. The European essential human rights document pro-
hibits discrimination of enjoying rights “on any ground … [including] 
association with a national minority…”8
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Mi-
norities, however, “protects only ‘national’ not religious communities” 
(Giegerich, 2004: 445). The European Charter for Regional and Minor-
ity Languages somewhat defines national minorities while speaking of 
“regional or minority languages”. According to the Charter, they are lan-
guages “traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals 
of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the 
State’s population.”9 This might help to interpret national minorities as 
a group of nationals of a State that are numerically smaller than the rest 
of the State’s population. However, if one takes this route, it excludes 
significant groups who are de facto minorities as a result of more recent 
migrations what has created a political issue in several European states.
Recommendations and guidelines issued by the High Commis-
sioner on National Minorities at the OSCE (Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe) also fall short of clearly defining the term. 
The Commissioner, Max van der Stoel, acknowledged in 1995 that “ex-
perts have been sitting for decades trying to come to a common defini-
tion” of national minorities but “have never succeeded in doing this.” As 
a practitioner, he pointed out “that you recognize a national minority 
when you see it.”10 He stated earlier that “the existence of a minority is a 
question of fact and not of definition.”11
There have been individual attempts of no or minimal impact to 
define national minorities. “Although the term minority has been used 
in some hard and soft international documents,” such attempts typically 
claim, “it has no definition in international law” (Rezai, 2015: 53). Thus 
7 Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and 
opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance 
with Article 49.
8 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amen-
ded by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14*Rome, 4.XI.1950, Article 14. 
9 The European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, Article 1.
10 https://www.osce.org/hcnm/36591?download=true (23.04.2019.)
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states are provided with an opportunity to define national minorities 
according to their self-interests which they generally do.
Some academics even argue that “the concept of national minority 
is traditionally understood in a European context as referring to ethnic 
groups living in a state, that are linked to a nation that has constituted 
its own state, so-called ‘kin-state’” (Turnšek et al., 2010: 7). This view is 
rather widespread among authors. The argument has been developed 
that “European integration can have an amplifying effect on nationalism 
regardless of whether kin states are existing members, acceding states 
or outside the process altogether” (Galbreath and McEvoy, 2010: 357). 
Craig has noticed different approaches of international organisations to 
the issue of “kin-state”: “However, whilst the HCNm focuses primarily 
on the situation of minority groups with kin-States, the Advisory Com-
mittee often seems to avoid mentioning specific minority groups and 
has tended to adopt a much broader perspective in relation to issues 
previously touched upon by the HCNm” (Craig, 2012: 57). 
It is still possible to object to the view of minority issues exclu-
sively or even dominantly in the lights of relations between states. The 
term “kin-state” is wrong to be used. The Advisory Committee has put 
a great effort to avoid even mentioning it in their opinions. It might 
mislead towards the wrong concept of a national minority. Some states 
see it as a tool of foreign policy and use the position of national minor-
ity for their own state’s advantage regardless of the actual situation. This 
understanding of the national minority has led some authors to define 
minority in the context of living outside of a perceived homeland. Many 
minorities, however, do not live in such a position. Roma might be the 
largest such group without a nation-state in Europe. There are, never-
theless, many others what the authors have failed to cover under their 
definition.
The lack of the definition, Jackson-Preece argues, is not a coinci-
dence but “it has hugely important implications with regard to the ex-
ercise and enforcement of minority rights” (Jackson-Preece, 2014: 3). 
She finds “controversy with regard to the definition of a minority,” that 
“centres upon the identity” providing “only those recognized minority 
rights holders” with “the validity of the associated minority rights claim” 
(Jackson-Preece, 2014: 3-4). Therefore, common understanding in in-
ternational organizations and among many academics is that setting 
only a framework instead of the definition potentially provides enjoy-
ment of rights to a higher number of groups and individuals. 
“The protection of national minorities is essential to stability, 
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in Europe, states the Framework Convention. “The EU approach to 
Eastern Europe as developed in the 1990s,” Pentassuglia argues, “rests 
on a variety of mechanisms and initiatives designed to favour and/or 
consolidate transition to market economy and further regional peace 
and stability” (Pentassuglia, 2001: 10). Western Europe has found an ex-
tended market where to export surplus produce, but this newly opened 
market in return could export instability and undermine western se-
curity. The situation has inevitably led to the development of different 
human rights and national minority standards in two parts of Europe.
Thus two contradictions of minority protection and rights have 
been raised. Minority rights are human rights. The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights in its preamble declared human rights as univer-
sal and individual.12 There is no universality in the application of minor-
ity rights which are, albeit individual, to be enjoyed collectively. A lack 
of universality and individuality are the two contradictions of minority 
rights that have been used by several states to deny some rights to some 
groups. 
“Countries of post-communist Europe,” Kimlycka argues, “have 
been pressured to adopt Western standards or models of multicultural-
ism and minority rights” (Kimlycka, 2002: 1). The Eastern and Central 
European states are fully integrated into the monitoring systems of the 
Council of Europe while several Western European states are selective 
to specific instruments to be applied or are refusing to become a part of 
the monitoring processes. Once the instruments have been adopted, it 
meant ‘old Europe’ had legal grounds to interfere and impose policies 
upon ‘new Europe’. The policies have been applied not through bilateral 
measures of dominant states but by the control of international orga-
nizations. When one looks at structures of pan-European and interna-
tional organizations, it is clear who dominates them. 
It took 20 years for the Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National minorities to have President 
based east of Ljubljana despite the fact, as it has been shown, that the 
majority of recognised minorities are based exactly in Central and East-
ern Europe. Andorra, France, Monaco and Turkey have neither signed 
nor ratified the Framework Convention, and further four countries, Ice-
land, Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece have signed but have never rati-
fied the Convention. Considering that Greece is politically, if not geo-
graphically, considered western, it makes Turkey the only non-western 
country that is not party-state to the Framework Convention. 
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During the 60 years of existence in various forms of the European 
Court of Human Rights, all presidents of the Court have been western-
ers. Between 1959 and 2019, there have been three British presidents, 
two each from France and Italy, and one from Belgium, Norway, Ger-
many, Switzerland and Luxembourg. The Court is yet to elect its presi-
dent from Central or Eastern Europe.
Ever since the establishment of the Council of Europe in 1949, a 
Secretary-General was a westerner. While many central and eastern Eu-
ropean countries have not been members of the organization during the 
first four decades, there were five highest appointments since Hungary, 
followed by other former communist states, joined the Council of Eu-
rope in 1990. Finally, Croatian Marija Pejčinović Burić was elected in 
2019. 
In 1993, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
later the OSCE, named first High Commissioner on Human rights. 
During the first 25 years of existence, none of the commissioners has 
come from central or eastern Europe. The organization attempted to 
deal with largely ethnic-based conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the 
former Soviet Union. Still, the commissioners came from The Nether-
lands, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Italy. 
The model of the behaviour of western states follows the pattern of 
post-imperial policies applied through international organizations like 
the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World 
Trade Organization. The West controls international organizations in-
stead of imposing a direct control or confrontation in bilateral relations 
with other actors. 
None of the nine UN secretaries-general and one acting in this 
position has come from Central or Eastern Europe. Despite the under-
standing that the leading positions are allocated to provide a sense of 
equality among the five unofficial regional groups. All other regions 
have provided a secretary-general in the past. Therefore, the under-
standing was an eastern European, and preferably a woman would take 
over the position and yet it was a middle-aged Portuguese man who was 
appointed in 2017. However, geopolitics played an important role here, 
and he was perhaps a better choice for Russia than any female or male 
candidate from Eastern Europe.13  
The Language Charter and the Framework Convention of the 
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followed by several Opinions by the OSCE High Commissioner for Na-
tional Minorities. Old Europe has invented and developed instruments 
for the new Europe in order to secure old Europe’s stability and security 
that they felt has been threatened by the size and speed of changes in 
the new Europe. National minority rights have been seen as potentially 
disturbing the state of affairs. Therefore national minority regimes have 
been put as a policy of conditionality in the accession process to the 
European Union. “In short,” Kymlicka concludes, “we see a dramatic 
difference between East and West in the basic approaches to substate 
nationalism and multination federalism” (Kymlicka, 2002: 17).
Democratic political competition in ethnically heterogeneous soci-
eties of Central and Eastern Europe has increased competition between 
a national majority, often wary of minority’s potential for secessionism, 
and minority, aware of its numerical inferiority. Minority tends to seek 
greater autonomy that would secure their own dominance at the sub-
state level where their presence might not be numerically inferior. Elec-
toral laws often impose restrictive electoral thresholds that prevent nu-
merically inferior groups from political representation unless the group 
homogenises behind one, often nationalist, political party. The Venice 
Commission observed that “electoral thresholds should not affect the 
chances of national minorities to be represented” (Venice Commission, 
2018: 28).
International instruments for the protection of minorities are ap-
plied differently in the old and new Europe. Liberal democratic tradi-
tions run more rooted in old Europe while Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries are rather selective in implementation of international 
standards. It is, however, possible to look at the control over interna-
tional institutions by the West. If their work is put under scrutiny, it is 
possible to see that significant concerns are often expressed in concert 
with individual state interests of leading western nations.
National Regimes of National Minority Protection
This part of the paper will offer a view into the diversity of indi-
vidual state attitudes towards national minority regimes. Broad data of 
national legislation and minority recognition will be brought forward to 
present this diversity and reimpose the argument of dual attitudes to-
wards the issue of national minority found generally in Europe. There-
fore case-studies from the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe will be contrasted.
France denies the existence of national minorities in the state 
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the Convention but claim no minority groups live in their countries. 
Greece, surrounded by countries with numerous national minority 
groups, uniquely is not part of European monitoring mechanisms for 
national minority rights protection and minority languages. 
“Virtually all of the former socialist-Bloc countries,” claims John-
son, “rushed to ratify the document in the mid-1990s after a consistent 
rhetorical message from the EU about the need to protect minorities” 
(Johnson, 2006: 33). Although this claim is generally valid, Latvia rati-
fied the Convention only in 2005, ten years after signing it and one year 
after joining the European Union.14 
Western states are more restrictive in defining and granting the 
status of national minorities. Some authors argue “the criteria for rec-
ognition are very restrictive for European immigrants and impossible 
for non-European immigrants or groups” (Rezai, 2015: 67). While this 
might generally stand, there are exceptions, like the Vietnamese minor-
ity in the Czech Republic or Egyptians in several countries in the Bal-
kans, and many of the 193 national groups recognised in Russia. “All 
193 ethnic groups identified by the 2010 census,” claims the Advisory 
Committee on the Framework Convention, “are considered as falling 
within the scope of application of the Framework Convention” (Fourth 
Opinion on the Russian Federation, 2018: 5). A large number of these 
groups have Asian origin. Roma communities across Europe look into 
its origins outside Europe.
“Four national minorities are officially recognized in Germany: the 
Danish minority, the Frisian ethnic group, the German Sinti and Roma, 
and the Sorbian people” (Fifth Report submitted by Germany, 2019: 8). 
There are three additional groups to which “the Framework Conven-
tion will also be applied to” (Fourth Opinion on Germany, 2015: 6). The 
Czech Republic has 14 recognised national minorities (Fourth Opinion 
on the Czech Republic, 2015: 4). Multicultural The Netherlands rec-
ognizes Frisians only as a national minority. Bosnia-Herzegovina has 
17 national minority groups. Austria recognizes six national minority 
groups (Fourth Report submitted by Austria, 2016: 18) while Hungary 
has 13 such groups (Fourth Opinion on Hungary, 2016: 5). Although 
“the Framework Convention is not recognised in the Spanish legal sys-
tem,” the Council of Europe’s bodies have repeatedly “been approached 
by persons belonging to organisations representing the Basque, Catalan 
and Galician cultures and languages, who have expressed interest in the 
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Spain, 2014: 4-6). Nevertheless, “the Spanish authorities take a pragmat-
ic approach in applying the provisions of the Framework Convention 
to Roma, including foreign Roma” (Fourth Opinion on Spain, 2014: 
10). At the same time, Albania recognizes and applies provisions of the 
Framework Convention to nine national minorities (Fourth Opinion 
on Albania, 2018: 9). Romania has 18 national minority groups (Fourth 
Report submitted by Romania, 2016: 16-17) while “Portugal does not 
recognize the existence of national minorities” (Fourth Report submit-
ted by Portugal, 2018: 4). 
These examples confirm the view that different interpretation and 
application of international agreements reflect the old-new or East-West 
division. There are, undoubtedly, exceptions to this practice. Italy stands 
out of the Western states where “12 recognised historical linguistic mi-
norities live” (Fifth Report submitted by Italy, 2019: 38). Meanwhile, 
there are only three “constitutionally recognised minorities” in Slovenia 
while the largest ones, former compatriots of Slovenes in Yugoslavia; 
Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, are missing from the list (Fourth Opinion 
on Slovenia 2018: 16). The Austrian government has expressed concerns 
for the lack of political representation and minority status of German 
speakers in Slovenia. The response of Slovenia, then a candidate country 
to the EU, was raising issues of inadequate linguistic rights for Slovene 
minority in Austria. “Austria was an EU member, and thus did not have 
to comply with even minimal levels of minority rights, conditionality 
(an identified failure on the part of the EU and Commission in particu-
lar),” Galbreath and McEvoy have argued under the subtitle “Member–
Acceding’ Dyads” (Galbreath and McEvoy, 2010: 362-363). Academic 
research of legislations across Europe shows “lots of articles in regard 
to minority protection … in the Eastern European countries as a result 
of EU call for protection of minorities.” The same research continues by 
stating “the trend is not the same” in Western Europe (Rezai, 2015: 62).
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe rarely act as allies or 
regional group but rather like rival states. Therefore this makes them 
weaker in communication with international organizations or with 
leading European powers. These countries have adopted a broad under-
standing of national minority as part of conditioned processes of Euro-
pean integrations. History might have played a particular role during 
the state and nation-building processes, thus creating national minori-
ties. Western European countries, meanwhile, do not recognise groups 
of its own citizens with a specific culture and language as a national 
minority. 
Turks and Poles are the two largest non-German communities 
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a traditional presence in a specific, usually rural, area. However, the 
Polish community have been present in various forms in Germany for 
well over a century. Even Turks that started arriving in more significant 
numbers in the 1960s have established, by now, presence in Germany of 
more than half a century. There is no stipulation of a number of years 
for the presence to be recognized as traditional. They are mainly urban 
communities with no connection to specific rural geographic area, and 
the authorities keep considering them as immigrants without a minor-
ity status that provides additional benefits and protection. 
Thinktanks and NGOs take less conservative understanding. The 
Minority Rights Group states three additional minority groups in Ger-
many, namely Vietnamese and “Turks and Kurds” under a joint entry.15 
The same organization disagrees with the Dutch interpretation of the 
term national minority and states, in addition to ten other immigrant 
communities, Moluccans and Muslims as minorities in the Nether-
lands.16 These organizations provide pressure upon national authorities 
and manage to make them change some of the policies, but they do not 
manage to change the major status of ethnic communities into national 
minorities.
Roma in Switzerland, Turks and Serbs in Austria, Portuguese in 
Luxembourg and many other national groups across Western Europe 
face the same problems of non-recognition. Perhaps the most ironic sit-
uation is with Croats in Austria. Traditional Croat minority is based in 
Burgenland and is recognized as a national minority. However, Croats 
that migrated to Austria during the 20th century do not have the status 
of national minority despite their numbers, distinct culture and identity. 
There are more such Croats in Austria than that of Burgenland Croats, 
who lose their status if they move out of Burgenland. 
Traditional local Roma communities in Germany and Austria are 
granted national minority status, Roma people from the EU countries 
also enjoy state benefits, but Roma originally from the outside of the 
European Union are deprived of similar rights. There is a clear hierar-
chy of different groups of Roma that states organize despite suggestions 
from the Council of Europe to the contrary and recognition of minority 
rights regardless of citizenship.
The overall view on national minorities regimes across Europe 
does reflect geopolitical changes of the 1990s and the consequently de-
veloped policies of conditionality that have affected the ‘new’ Europe. 
15 https://minorityrights.org/country/germany/ (04.05.2019.)
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The EU engagement “transposes the problems of national and interna-
tional minority regimes into the realm of Europeanization” (Nancheva, 
2016: 136). The same author argues, this policy does not provide a solu-
tion. The involvement, nevertheless, was necessary. The ‘old’ Europe’s 
security concerns have not been unfounded. Dissolution of the three 
former communist federations and ethnic strife present in the region 
provide strength to arguments in support of such policies. The issue is 
whether the adopted legislation at the national level and ratification of 
international instruments have provided for the increased security in 
the ‘new’ Europe. Besides, the question is whether international organ-
isations can continue ignoring the ‘old’ Europe’s insistence on the very 
restrictive application of international instruments in their national leg-
islations. While violent conflicts have been avoided, several incidents in 
Catalonia, Northern Ireland and France draw the attention to the need 
to deal with the issues rather than ignore them.   
(Re)securitization of Minority Issues
The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the recognition of its successor 
states have been based on popular will, i.e. referenda supporting decla-
rations of political elites. The internal borders have been recognised as 
new international borders. Ethnic element in the creation of new states 
has been refused in the post-Yugoslav case. A similar principle has been 
applied in the post-Soviet Union. Internal republics’ borders have been 
recognized as boundaries of the successor states. The ethnic principle, 
however, has been applied in the unification of Germany. This was the 
first change of borders in Europe since the Helsinki Accords of 1975. 
The border changes in the 1990s, regardless of the principle, were 
not opposed within Germany while some ethnic groups have violently 
resisted the newly created states in post-communist Europe. The societ-
ies have been reformed, and democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
have been applied to national legislation. Misinterpretation of minority 
rights, however, came with democracy to some of the countries. Tyr-
anny of majority has been applied in most radical cases of the exercise 
of the majority’s will. National and regional security issues have been af-
fected and consequently national minority rights regime has been ques-
tioned. When the majority-minority conflict became violent, it resulted 
in the increased number of citizens migrating towards the area where 
they felt secure. Such areas are either where their ethnic group lives as 
the majority or in the ‘old’ Europe. The new immigrants thus show no 
concerns over moving from the state in which they had the official sta-
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such status and neither would be seeking it. Nevertheless, at the same 
time, they were ready to engage in violent conflict in the state of their 
origin in order to secure some specific group status.
A state in the ‘new’ Europe is primarily concerned with its territo-
rial integrity and minorities are often seen as a threat. Thus, minority is-
sues have been securitised. The minorities’ collective behaviour is often 
led by the justice-seeking ideology of equality and protection. While, 
central and eastern European countries tend to be concerned more 
with security issue and act accordingly, the western part of the conti-
nent, according to Kymlicka, “hope to achieve both of these goals – to 
simultaneously promote both security for states and justice for minori-
ties” (Kymlicka, 2002: 145). Thus, the movement of people from ‘new’ 
Europe to the ‘old’ Europe, whether they are abandoning their state as 
majority members or as recognised minority members, shows primary 
concern with the lack of implementation of the standards that have been 
officially adopted. Security is not only about the survival of the states 
but also about the survival of societal (group) identities (Jutila, 2006: 
168). These migrants are thus showing confidence in developed state’s 
practices in the ‘old’ Europe even if some international instruments have 
not been applied in such a state, but a simultaneous achievement of both 
goals seems to be more likely in an established liberal democracy. 
Security concerns contributed to European institutions’ develop-
ment of instruments for minority protection in the 1990s. Johnson ar-
gues that “minority protection can be seen from a more strategic per-
spective,” in a context of “a need for regional stability” … and … “a con-
cern over migration patterns” (Johnson, 2006: 45). A question remains 
whether the application of instruments for the protection of national 
minorities has prevented further security threats in ‘new Europe’. When 
a state is ruled by a nationalist and authoritarian leader, it is more likely 
to act as ‘kin-state’ and therefore further securitise the minority issue in 
neighbouring countries. The example of Viktor Orban’s Hungary and 
its relations with neighbours underlines the inadequateness of the ‘kin-
state’ approach. 
The results are seen in bilateral relations between the states. Slova-
kia introduced language law in 2009 restricting use of minority languag-
es that affected primarily Hungarian minority. Hungarian president was 
banned from attending a ceremony in Slovakian town with Hungarian 
majority in the same year. In 2019, Slovakia effectively criminalised 
singing foreign national anthems unless the official delegation from that 
country is present. It was Hungary, of course, who reacted the strongest. 
Instead of deteriorating into a more serious issue, the democratic 
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bullets’, operating under normal democratic procedures” (Kimlycka, 
2002: 10-11). However, instead of inter-state conflict, it is discrimina-
tion of national minorities that have become the instrument for solv-
ing contested issues. Parallel societies in Slovakia, Romania and several 
other European countries exist. Integration of Romanian society has not 
been achieved as the majority is concerned with state security. They see 
minority as a threat to it, while the minority is concerned with justice 
and are vulnerable to the question of perceived inequality.
Observing different case studies, Kimlycka argues that “the result is 
sometimes described as the phenomenon of ‘parallel societies’, or even 
of ‘two solitudes’” (Kimlycka, 2002: 12). Turnšek, Hinge and Karakat-
sani recall Amartya Sen’s Identity and Violence (Sen, 2007) when stating 
the importance “to define what form of multiculturalism should be tak-
en. Namely, the vocal defence of multiculturalism is very often merely 
a plea for ‘plural monoculturalism’, understood as cultures co-existing 
side by side” (Turnšek et al., 2010: 13). This is what in effect, keeps the 
communities separate. Different terminology, two solitudes or plural 
monoculturalism or parallel societies, describes the same situation of 
a divided nation and a presence of inter-cultural gap that provides the 
potential for politicisation of the cultural differences and ultimately to a 
widening of the political gap in the state. “Many people,” says Kimlycka, 
“avoid inter-group contact, where possible, or at least do not go out of 
their way to increase their contact with members of the other group” 
(Kimlycka, 2002: 11).
Orban’s triumphal statement following the electoral victory de-
scribed the result as “a noble form of revenge” over the “political forces 
who voted against the re-admittance of Hungarians living beyond our 
current state borders.”17 The electoral success came “about thanks to the 
votes of precisely those cross-border Hungarians,” Orban underlined.18 
Similar examples of using “passportisation” of minority issues by issuing 
citizenship to ethnic groups living abroad reflect nationalist policies at 
home and add to security threats felt abroad from actions of national 
minorities. 
Western countries have used tools of a de facto federalisation or, at 
least, decentralisation to solve minority issues. “Respect for human dig-
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as Pentassuglia argues (Pentassuglia, 2001: 4). “There is enormous resis-
tance,” Kimlycka found in central and eastern European countries, “to 
the idea of federalism or other forms of territorial autonomy for national 
minorities” (Kimlycka, 2002: 16). The only cases of de-centralising poli-
cies in the ‘new’ Europe came after violent conflicts, except for North 
Macedonia. It was often a refusal to decentralise and thus accommodate 
some of the minority demands that led to violence. A consociation was a 
solution for post-conflict states in this region. With the supervised sov-
ereignty over Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, security concerns have 
been partly solved. In North Macedonia, the intervention took place to 
prevent violence and could be judged success from the security point 
of view. 
Democratic electoral processes tend to uncover deep divisions in 
society. Majority group wants to secure nation-state and its borders with 
strong central institutions. The majority community, in its national ro-
mantic sense of past times, creates an atmosphere in which popular sup-
port often moves towards more nationalistic majority political groups. 
Minority group feels endangered in a position of numerical inferiority 
and wants greater autonomy, preservation of its own culture, traditions, 
language and political representation. They are thus seeking political 
groups with stronger demands for more autonomy, more nationalist 
political demands and leading even towards secessionist movements. 
“The only way to eliminate secessionist mobilization and communal di-
visions would be to eliminate substate nationalisms, and that in turn 
could only be achieved by restricting individual rights and democratic 
freedoms” (Kymlicka, 2002: 15). Suspension of democratic instruments 
and values cannot be a solution in a functioning democratic regime.
In Central and Eastern Europe, it is the state’s and minority’s be-
haviour that is creating security concerns. In the West, it is generally 
political parties and radical political groups that have moved from jus-
tice based concerns to security based minority concerns.  With the rise 
of far-right nationalist political parties across Europe and their entrance 
into national governments, state actions have increasingly becoming 
based on securitised interpretation of minority issues. Europe is “con-
fronted with currents,” Angela Merkel said in 2019, “who want to de-
stroy the Europe of our values.” Media reported her saying “Far-right 
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The first targets of such groups and policies are visible minorities, 
i.e., racial minorities, many immigrant groups and Roma. “Rallies and 
marches on Roma housing estates, organised by extreme right-wing po-
litical organisations,” have been noted in the Czech Republic and the 
blame pointed at politicians who “instead of seeking to build a cohe-
sive and tolerant society … perpetuate divisions.” (Fourth Opinion on 
the Czech Republic, 2015: 1). In Romania, “Roma continue to suffer 
discrimination in access to housing, infrastructure, employment, health 
care and education,’ while “segregation of Roma children at school is 
still reported” (Fourth Opinion on Romania, 2017: 1).
In 2014, ‘the Government Plenipotentiary for Roma Communi-
ties was removed from the human rights structure and placed under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Interior’ in Slovakia (Fourth Opinion 
on Slovakia, 2014: 1). The change had been the consequence of securi-
tising Roma issue in Slovakia. “Roma continue to face grave obstacles 
in accessing rights” (Fourth Opinion on Slovakia, 2014: 2). It has been 
reported in Austria “that Roma continue not to be taken seriously when 
reporting instances of alleged discrimination but are informed by rel-
evant officials that such attitudes are common-place and thus not dis-
criminatory” (Fourth Opinion on Austria, 2016: 9). In Germany “mani-
festations of antisemitism, anti-Gypsyism, and anti-Muslim and anti-
immigrant sentiments are reported to be rising, as well as attacks against 
asylum-seekers” (Fourth Opinion on Germany, 2015: 1).
If minority groups are often perceived as a security threat to the 
state, Roma groups, however, never attempted any secessionist policies. 
Therefore, widespread discrimination of Roma is pure racism at work. 
Following the NATO intervention in 1999, groups of Albanians carried 
out attacks on local Serbs that media has described as revenge. However, 
local Roma also came under attack that the United Nations Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, addressed: “The continued lack of adequate se-
curity remains an overriding concern for the remaining minority com-
munities in Kosovo. […] The Roma and Ashkalija communities have 
suffered from violent attacks involving hand grenades, for example, and 
other explosions and arson in various locations in Kosovo.”20 Other or-
ganizations like Human Rights Watch also carried out reports of vio-
lence against national minorities in Kosovo.21 
20 http://www.errc.org/roma-rights-journal/no-end-to-attacks-on-roma-in-kosovo 
(24.05.2019.) 
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Conclusion
The paper has shown the importance of establishing an interna-
tional minority rights regime across Europe with no distinction be-
tween the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Europe. However, it is evident that the 
conditions in the two regions are dissimilar. The selective recognition 
of minority groups in some of the most influential western countries 
reflects internal insecurities but also provides an example to central and 
eastern European countries to be selective in applying the rights they 
had to sign for during the processes of Europeanisation. The argument 
is that “external norm entrepreneurship of the EU soon attracted inter-
est in the internal application of minority norms, which turned out to 
be rather limited,” (Nancheva, 2016: 132) and proceeds that “promot-
ing and developing this regime, such as it is, at the supranational level 
perpetuates national minority problems which integration is uniquely 
positioned to transcend” (Nancheva, 2016: 133). The longer the states 
have been within the EU, the less likely they are becoming to apply the 
instruments of minority protection by the pan-European organisations.
Domestic concerns with the exercise of democracy and the reli-
ance on nationalist rhetoric and ideology create conditions for the focus 
of political debate on state preservation and removal of security threats 
to the state. Minorities are seen in such situation as threat and the whole 
issue has been securitised. It is irrelevant whether the threat is real or 
perceived. The whole process results in discrimination, often real but 
also possibly perceived only, of the national minority. The individual 
and collective insecurities, economic uncertainties and opportunities in 
the developed part of Europe contribute to migrations that consequent-
ly bring “others” to challenge job security and position in the society of 
the traditional western citizens. In addition to the circumstances that 
are not subject of this paper, the whole process results in the rise of 
nationalist politics in the (old) Europe. The consequence is reaction-
ary policy towards newly arrived communities but also lesser care for 
the traditional national minorities in western Europe. States have de-
veloped “increasingly security-oriented approach to migration, with the 
strong emphasis on prevention, effective border controls, push- backs, 
restrictive asylum policies and militarization of usual police functions” 
(Jakešević and Tatalović, 2018: 37).
Recognition of the new communities as national minorities would 
be acceptance of the reality and diversity of the state in the contemporary 
world and not as a reflection of national romanticist views that allowed, 
in their liberal interpretation, for others to be live in their traditional mi-
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Framework Convention’s scope of application to immigrant groups” on 
the grounds of “the omission of a definition of the term ‘national minor-
ity’” (Craig, 2012: 55).
The irony is that due to the perceived security threat in one part 
of Europe, some of the main values of developed liberal societies in the 
other part of Europe, such as human rights, have been endangered. The 
possible “option is to bring issues back into the realm of ‘normal poli-
tics’,” with the addition of “desecuritization of international migration” 
(Jutila, 2006: 169). It is a question, however, whether this is possible in 
an atmosphere of risen tensions and politicians preparedness to exploit 
fault-lines within the society and Europe in order to secure a position in 
power. “Political psychology has begun to explore the notion of group-
level empathy” (Sirin, Valentino, Villalobos 2017: 429) which could be 
tested in relations between minority and majority groups in the state.
Nancheva summed up the critical view of international instru-
ments for the protection. “Locking the status of national minorities into 
the security agenda of the state, presuming the inevitably disadvantaged 
position of members of national minorities, and refusing to delegate the 
regulation of national minorities to supranational governance appear 
to be key features of the ‘European standard’ of minority protection” 
(Nancheva, 2016: 144).
The reborn nation-state on the outskirts of the European Union 
has to be redefined in order to provide primarily for security and new 
challenges it is facing in the contemporary era. The process of signifi-
cant racial, religious, cultural and civilizational change is undergoing 
across Europe. While sovereignty and the nation-state are understood 
differently than during the Cold War and immediately after it, the un-
derstanding of a national minority has not been changed. This has to 
be redefined in order to provide conditions for securing stability in 
Europe. Recognition and provision of legal status for all national mi-
norities across Europe can create political solution and security without 
securitisation of national minorities. It is a huge but necessary task due 
to fast-changing processes. 
Therefore, both redefining nation-state at the national level and 
adopting a pan-European understanding of national minority are ne-
cessities for the preservation of security and stability in a changed Eu-
rope. Craig understands that “the failure to define the term ‘national 
minority’ … “can be linked to its status as a multilateral human rights 
treaty imposing legal obligations on States and the need to achieve a 
consensus amongst States,” (Craig, 2012: 47) which is right in the sense 
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and liberal politics at supranational level in order to transfer them uni-
versally to a national level. Another study offers the view that “actors 
may also be convinced that international norms provide a solution to 
national problems” (Jackson and Parke, 2006: 137). There is also a view 
that “dyads between old members and new members should see greater 
pressure from the ‘West’ on the ‘East’” (Galbreath and McEvoy, 2010: 
363). 
The paper concludes with the view that the securitisation of the 
minority issues, developed in the ‘new’ Europe has consequences in 
the ‘old’ Europe. This together contributes to complexities of securing 
rights of national minorities as the works of international organisations 
are often undermined by the exercise of sovereignty at a national level. 
Democratic conditions are providing for competing ideologies and the 
opportunity for populist claims that undermine position of minorities 
who are perceived as ‘others’ and increasingly include new unrecognised 
minorities. It all ends with national minorities regimes endangered at 
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Neven Anđelić* 
Politički, sigurnosni i 
pravni izazovi: dileme 
oko manjinskih pitanja 
u Europi
SAŽETAK:  Nacionalna država je redefinirana, dok su pitanja koja utječu na 
njezin današnji oblik ostala nepromijenjena. Pitanja izbjeglica i mi-
gracija nisu bila predmetom pravnog reguliranja od 1951. godine 
na globalnoj razini te od početka novog tisućljeća na razini EU. 
Nacionalne manjine doživljavaju se kao prijetnja u “novoj” Europi 
dok su međunarodne organizacije koje bi trebale pomoći državama 
Srednje i Istočne Europe pod kontrolom Zapada i djeluju primarno 
u interesu zapadnih država. Na taj način dolazi do osnaživanja i 
naglašavanja dualnosti. Dojam je da Europska Unija, Vijeće Euro-
pe i OESS ignoriraju proces značajnih rasnih, religijskih, kulturnih 
i civilizacijskih promjena u Europi. Stoga su slabije države nepri-
premljene i nespremne baviti se manjinskim pitanjima, a posebice 
pitanjem novih migracija u Europi. Nacionalna suverenost pove-
zana je sa sekuritizacijom manjinskih pitanja, posebice u Srednjoj 
i Istočnoj Europi. Taj proces na ruku ide etno-nacionalističkim 
populistima koji ulaze u vlade, koje često stvaraju politički pritisak 
i ekonomsku nestabilnost potičući tako građane da emigriranju u 
“staru” Europu. Proces reakcije i antagoniziranja imigranata se po-
navlja, a cijela Europa suočena je s problemom koji bi mogle riješiti 
funkcionalne liberalne demokracije promjenom modusa operandi 
međunarodnih organizacija. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI: Manjina, migracija, sigurnost, populizam, nacionalna-država
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